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I. INTRODUCTION
A New York Times reporter, involved in a situation of national security, re-
ceived several subpoenas from a federal prosecutor in order to establish the
identity of a confidential source.' After refusing to appear before the grand
jury, the judge ordered the reporter to be held in contempt of court and jailed.2
Given the heightened state of national security, one observer of the situation
noted:
It is said currently press subpoenas have multiplied, that mutual distrust and tension be-
tween press and officialdom have increased, that reporting styles have changed, and that
there is now more need for confidential sources, particularly where the press seeks news
about minority cultural and political groups or dissident organizations suspicious of the law
and public officials.
This observation by Justice White in Branzburg v. Hayes came thirty-three
years ago, but the situation described could easily have been ripped from the
headlines of 2005.' The case of Judith Miller, the New York Times reporter
who was jailed for contempt of court because she refused to testify before a
grand jury about the identity of her confidential sources, provides an excellent
parallel.' The current climate of terrorism, at home and abroad, has created
t Candidate for J.D., Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, 2007.
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I Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 675-76 (1972).
2 Id at 678.
3 Id. at 699.
4 See, e.g., Clarence Page, These Are Risky Times for Hard News and Views, CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 27, 2005, at Cl 1.
5 See Don Van Natta Jr. et al., The Miller Case: A Notebook, a Cause, a Jail Cell and a
Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005, § 1, at 1. This article provides a comprehensive summary
of the entire Judith Miller affair, detailing the background of how she came to be subpoe-
naed in federal court to disclose a confidential source, her subsequent jail time for refusing
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extraordinary and unprecedented issues, giving the debate over journalistic
privileges an even greater importance.6 The controversy over a journalist's
privilege to conceal the identity of confidential sources seems just as relevant
today but with one important difference: if precedent is to be followed, it
should be well-settled law that a journalist has no constitutional privilege
against divulging sources in a criminal proceeding.7
Branzburg v. Hayes, a landmark 1972 Supreme Court case, stated in unam-
biguous terms that the Constitution does not grant journalists a privilege; re-
porters have the same duty as the average citizen to testify before a grand jury
for the purpose of indicting those who have committed crimes.8 Many states
have created shield laws to protect journalists9 either through statute'0 or
through common law." Shield laws protect journalists against forced divul-
to reveal her source, and her actions after her release.
6 On September 20, 2001, nine days after the September 11 th attacks, President Bush
proposed the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. On November 25, 2002,
Congress enacted the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 2, 116 Stat.
2140. For a history of the development of homeland security and the war on terror, see
COMMITrEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HOMELAND SECU-
RITY WAR ON TERROR TIMELINE (2005),
http://homelandsecurity.house.gov/files/timeline.pdf. The White House's Homeland Secu-
rity website provides details as to its official mission and steps the department has taken to
carry it out. Homeland Security, http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/homeland (last visited
Dec. 26, 2005).
7 As shall be discussed, the Branzburg v. Hayes decision provides no constitutional
privilege for journalists, though subsequent court decisions have not always followed this
opinion, focusing instead on the concurring and dissenting opinions. For a history of
Branzburg, see Glenn A. Browne, Just Between You and Me... For Now: Reexamining a
Qualified Privilege for Reporters to Keep Sources Confidential in Grand Jury Proceedings,
1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 739, 741-753.
8 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 665.
9 A "shield law" is defined as "[a] statute that affords journalists the privilege not to
reveal confidential sources." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1410 (8th ed. 2004).
10 Currently, thirty-one states have shield laws in place. Karl H. Schmid, Journalist's
Privilege in Criminal Proceedings: An Analysis of United States Courts of Appeals' Deci-
sions from 1973-1999, AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1441, 1442-43 (2002). New Jersey provides an
example of a state statute granting journalists a protective shield against revealing confiden-
tial sources. The New Jersey statute states:
Subject to Rule 37, a person engaged on, engaged in, connected with, or employed by
news media for the purpose of gathering, procuring, transmitting, compiling, editing or
disseminating news for the general public or on whose behalf news is so gathered, pro-
cured, transmitted, compiled, edited or disseminated has a privilege to refuse to dis-
close, in any legal or quasi-legal proceeding or before any investigative body, includ-
ing, but not limited to, any court, grand jury, petit jury, administrative agency, the Leg-
islature or legislative committee, or elsewhere.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West 1994).
I Eighteen states have established a shield law through common law. Wyoming re-
mains the only state in the union that has not established any type of shield law either
through statute or common law. Jeffrey S. Nestler, Comment, The Underprivileged Profes-
sion: The Case for Supreme Court Recognition of the Journalist's Privilege, 154 U. PA. L.
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gence of sources in a grand jury setting in various contexts, depending upon
where the grand jury takes place and whether it is a state or federal crime. Cur-
rently, there is no federal shield law to protect journalists, but that may be
changing.1
2
A bill, entitled the "Free Flow of Information Act," has been introduced si-
multaneously in both the Senate and House. If enacted, the legislation would
serve as a federal shield law. 3 According to Senator Lugar, one of the bill's
proponents, the Free Flow of Information Act "[would provide] journalists
with certain rights and abilities to seek sources and report appropriate informa-
tion without fear of intimidation or imprisonment.'
4
Inherent in this discussion is the public policy that freedom of the press is
essential to maintaining democracy as we know it. 5 Thomas Jefferson once
said that because our government is based on public opinion, "were it left to
me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers or
newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the
latter."' 6 This statement was frequently quoted in a 2005 hearing before the
Senate Judiciary Committee on the proposed federal shield law. 7 While the
quote certainly portrays a noble and grand ideal, is it really relevant at all to
whether journalists should be immune from testifying about a crime-
something that every other citizen is called to do? 8
REV. 201, 226 (2005).
'2 See id. at 230 (discussing attempts by Congress to enact a federal shield law).
13 See S. 1419, 109th Cong. (2005). Senators Lugar (R-Ind.), Dodd (D-Conn.), Nelson
(D-Fla.), Jeffords (lnd.-Vt.), and Lautenberg (D-N.J.) brought the bill before the Senate.
Representatives Pence (R-Ind.) and Boucher (D-Va.) brought the bill before the House of
Represenatives.
14 Reporter's Shield Legislation: Issues and Implications: Hearing Before the S. Judici-
ary Comm., 109th Cong. 3 (2005) (testimony of Sen. Richard Lugar, Chairman, S. Foreign
Relations Comm.) [hereinafter Senate Hearing].
15 See Laura R. Handman, Protection of Confidential Sources: A Moral, Legal and
Civic Duty, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 573, 574-76 (2005). Handman's
article, which emphatically points out the need for a journalist's privilege against revealing a
source, contains a comprehensive summary of how journalists' use of confidential sources
have led to important political and social changes in the United States. Id.
16 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington (1787), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 57 (Lipscomb and Burgh eds., Memorial ed. 1903-1904).
17 Senate Hearing, supra note 14, at 2 (testimony of Sen. Arlen Specter, Chairman, S.
Judiciary Comm.); id. at 4 (testimony of Sen. Christopher Dodd). Representative Pence also
used a Jefferson quotation, "our liberty cannot be guarded but by the freedom of the press,
nor that limited without danger of losing it," in order to drive home the point that freedom of
press has long been revered as an essential element of democracy. Id. at 6 (testimony of
Rep. Mike Pence).
I8 There are, of course, legal privileges carved out by the law to protect confidentiality
such as the marital communications privilege, the physician-patient privilege, the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege, the attorney-client privilege, the cleric-congregant privilege, the
journalist's privilege, the trade secret privilege, and the work product privilege. See 23 AM.
2006]
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The proponents of the federal shield law argue that continuing to require
journalists to reveal their confidential sources will create a "chilling effect."' 9
The term "chilling effect" is defined as "I. The result of a law or practice that
seriously discourages the exercise of a constitutional right, such as the right to
appeal or the right of free speech. 2. Broadly, the result when any practice is
discouraged. '2' Thus, sources who provide journalists with the information
they need to report on matters of great public importance, but who require a
pledge of confidentiality to do so, may grow extremely hesitant about reveal-
ing information. In turn, many important issues may never be brought to
light. 2' Supporters of a federal shield law may argue that the first definition is
more appropriate. This utilization is questionable because journalistic privi-
leges are not recognized in the Constitution.22 More appropriate is the second
definition, which is explicitly, and necessarily, broad. There is ample room for
debate as to whether a lack of guaranteed confidentiality would have a "chill-
ing effect" on future sources who would be afraid to reveal information if they
knew they would somehow be implicated in the matter.23
The lack of constitutional protection, however, does not mean that there is
no basis for protecting the confidentiality agreement between a journalist and
his or her source. Congress recognizes many protections for those who are not
literally shielded by the Constitution. The time has come for a federal shield
JUR. 2D Depositions § 27 (2002).
19 The term "chilling effect" is often used in the debate on journalistic privilege by those
parties that wish to see a journalist-source privilege enacted. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Meigs,
503 S.W.2d 748, 750 (Ky. 1971); Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir.
1970). Both cases led up to, and are included in, the Court's Branzburg decision.
20 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 257 (8th ed. 2004).
21 As Senator Dodd notes, "Imagine for a moment what would happen if citizens with
knowledge of wrongdoing would not or could not come forward to speak confidentially
with members of the press. Serious journalism would virtually cease to exist in my view.
Wrongdoing would not be uncovered." Senate Hearing, supra note 14, at 5 (testimony of
Sen. Christopher Dodd).
22 The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The argument that a journalist
has a constitutional right to confidentiality was specifically rejected by the Branzburg ma-
jority. See discussion infra Part lI.B.
23 Compare Rowan Scarborough, Probes Could Have Chilling Effect, WASH. TIMES,
Nov. 9, 2005, at A04 (suggesting that the increase of government probes and subpoenas of
reporters about government leaks may cause a chilling effect on government newspaper
sources), with Michael Isikoff, New York Times Investigative Correspondent, Remarks at
National Press Club Panel Discussion, Confidentiality and the Press (Nov. It, 2005) ("1
have not seen a big impact from this case, not that this is scientific or anything other than
anecdotal. A lot ofjokes with sources about, oh yeah, now I know you'd be willing to go to
jail, right? But when it comes down to it, people tell you stuff for a reason. They leak for a
reason-because they think it's important that you know something, or they want something
out or whatever.").
24 The Federal Rules of Evidence recognize many privileges (such as attorney-client,
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law that, with certain exceptions for cases of national security, would protect a
journalist's confidential communications. Such a protection would enable an
era of unfettered truth to be presented in the press, which would, consequen-
tially lead to an era of truth in our society and ultimately in our government.25
This Comment explores the need, usefulness, and desirability of a federal
shield law. In exploring the issue, it is necessary to first discuss Branzburg v.
Hayes, including incidents leading up to the decision and subsequent treat-
ment. 6 After discussing Branzburg's impact, this Comment will examine state
shield laws, both those enacted through statute and through the common law,
in an effort to determine their ability to protect journalists and what character-
istics make them effective.
After analyzing what the states have done, this Comment will discuss the
proposed federal shield law and analyze it section by section for its strengths
and weaknesses and offer a revised federal shield law. Finally, this Comment
will conclude with an analysis of how the proposed shield law would play out
in "real world" terms, using the Judith Miller fact pattern as a hypothetical
situation to show the strengths of the proposed statute.
II. HISTORICAL DISCUSSION: BRANZBURG V. HAYES
A. Background-Bringing the Issue to a Head
The Branzburg v. Hayes case is a compendium of four cases decided on the
issue of whether a journalist may be compelled to testify before a grand jury
and reveal confidential sources.27 The decision included Branzburg v. Pound,"
doctor-patient) traditionally available at common law. FED. R. EVID. 501.
25 The House Committee notes to Federal Rule of Evidence 501 state that "the Commit-
tee, through a single Rule, 501, left the law of privileges in its present state and further pro-
vided that privileges shall continue to be developed by the courts of the United States under
a uniform standard applicable both in civil and criminal cases." Id. It seems apparent that
Congress intended the law of privileges to be an evolving one and, though the note states
that it is leaving the courts free to develop the law, Congress also has the authority to enact
such a change.
26 Though Branzburg is a significant starting point, it is not the focus of this Comment.
Since Branzburg, many thoughtful articles have discussed the decision's positive and nega-
tive effects. See, e.g., Theodore Campagnolo, The Conflict Between State Press Shield Laws
and Federal Criminal Proceedings: The Rule 501 Blues, 38 GONZ. L. REv. 445 (2002-
2003); Paul Marcus, The Reporter's Privilege: An Analysis of the Common Law, Branzburg
v. Hayes, and Recent Statutory Developments, 25 ARIZ. L. REv. 815 (1983-1984); Craig A.
Newman, Qualified Privilege for Journalists, Branzburg v. Hayes: A Decade Later, 61 U.
DET. J. URB. L. 463 (1983-1984).
27 See United States v. Caldwell, 402 U.S. 942 (1971); Branzburg v. Hayes, 402 U.S.
942 (1971); Matter of Pappas, 402 U.S. 942 (1971) (granting certiorari to the cases).
28 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 665 (1972).
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Branzburg v. Meigs,29 In re Pappas," and Caldwell v. United States." The
Branzburg cases involve Paul Branzburg, a journalist for the Louisville, Ken-
tucky based Courier-Journal. In Pound, Branzburg wrote a story "describing
in detail his observations of two young residents of Jefferson County synthe-
sizing hashish from marihuana, an activity which, they asserted, earned them
about $5,000 in three weeks."32 As a condition of gathering the information for
the story he promised to, and did, change the names of the individuals in-
volved.33 Branzburg received a subpoena to testify before a grand jury regard-
ing his source of information for the article. In court, Branzburg argued that the
Kentucky Reporters Privilege Statute34 and the First Amendment protected him
from revealing his sources' identities.35 The judge presiding over the case de-
nied Branzburg's arguments, leading Branzburg to sue the judge and appeal to
the Kentucky Court of Appeals for prohibition and mandamus.36 The Kentucky
Court of Appeals rejected Branzburg's claim, holding that the statute "did not
permit a reporter to refuse to testify about events he had observed personally,
including the identities of those persons he had observed."37
Branzburg found himself in trouble again for refusing to identify a confiden-
tial source in a grand jury setting, leading to the case of Branzburg v. Meigs.38
Branzburg wrote a story about observed drug use in Frankfort, Kentucky. 9
After receiving a subpoena from the state prosecutor, which he unsuccessfully
moved to quash, the court provided Branzburg partial protection for his
sources except that the court required him to testify about illegal events he ac-
29 503 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. 1971), aff'd, 402 U.S. 665 (1972).
30 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1971), aff'd, 402 U.S. 665 (1972).
31 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 402 U.S. 665 (1972).
32 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972).
33 Id. at 668.
34 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (LexisNexis 2005). The text of the statute is as fol-
lows:
No person shall be compelled to disclose in any legal proceeding or trial before any
court, or before any grand or petit jury, or before the presiding officer of any tribunal,
or his agent or agents, or before the General Assembly, or any committee thereof, or
before any city or county legislative body, or any committee thereof, or elsewhere, the
source of any information procured or obtained by him, and published in a newspaper
or by a radio or television broadcasting station by which he is engaged or employed, or
with which he is connected.
Id.
35 See Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345, 346-47 (Ky. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 665
(1972).
36 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 668. As a procedural note, the case that came before the Su-
preme Court was known as Branzburg v. Hayes instead of Branzburg v. Pound because
Judge Hayes succeeded Judge Pound, who presided over Branzburg's original hearing. Id. at
669 n.3.
37 Id. at 669.




tually observed.4" Branzburg once again appealed to the Kentucky Court of
Appeals and once again lost. The Court of Appeals held that "sources of in-
formation of a newspaper reporter are not privileged under the First Amend-
ment."
While Branzburg dealt with his legal troubles in Kentucky, another journal-
ist faced the same problem in Massachusetts. In re Pappas involved a situation
where the Black Panthers allowed a television news journalist from Rhode Is-
land to tape one of their meetings, but only on the condition that he not report
on any of the information he saw or heard-he was only allowed to tape an
anticipated police raid of their meeting.42 Pappas received a subpoena to testify
before the grand jury about the details of the meeting but refused to testify,
claiming First Amendment privilege.43 The trial judge ruled that the law of
Massachusetts (where the meeting took place) did not provide a statutory privi-
lege for reporters and further held that there is no privilege created by the First
Amendment.44 Though the petitioner argued that such a forced testimony
would damage all journalists' ability to gather news, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts ruled that any adverse effect upon the ability to gather
news was merely theoretical and held that "the public has a right to every
man's evidence. 45
Meanwhile in California, New York Times reporter Earl Caldwell was cover-
ing the Black Panthers when state prosecutors subpoenaed him, ordering him
to "testify and to bring with him notes and tape recordings of interviews given
him for publication by officers and spokesmen of the Black Panther Party con-
cerning the aims, purposes and activities of that organization."46 After refusing
to testify and repeated motions to quash the subpoena, the court held Caldwell
in contempt and incarcerated him.47 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit heard Caldwell's case and ruled, unlike the courts of Kentucky and
Massachusetts, that "the First Amendment provided a qualified testimonial
privilege to newsmen; in its view, requiring a reporter like Caldwell to testify
would deter his informants from communicating with him in the future and
would cause him to censor his writings in an effort to avoid being subpoe-
naed. 48
40 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 669-70.
41 Id. at 670.
42 In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297, 298 (Mass. 1971), aff'd, 402 U.S. 665 (1972).
43 Id.
44 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 673.
45 In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d at 299.
46 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 675.
47 Id. at 678.
48 Id. at 679.
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The facts of the four cases are extremely similar and all took place near the
same timeframe. 49 One common bond among them is that all four of the jour-
nalists had actually observed the events in question before the grand jury, mak-
ing them prime witnesses for an indictment." The Ninth Circuit's decision cre-
ated a circuit split between jurisdictions and the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to settle the dispute.'
B. A Divided Court Rules That There Is No Reporter Privilege
The Branzburg Court weighed the argument of freedom of the press against
the necessity of furnishing a grand jury with the maximum amount of informa-
tion to decide whether an indictment is necessary. 2 With a five-four split, the
Court concluded that there is
no basis for holding that the public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective
grand jury proceedings is insufficient to override the consequential, but uncertain, burden
on news gathering that is said to result from insisting that reporters, like other citizens, re-
spond to relevant questions put to them in the course of a valid grand jury investigation or
criminal trial. 3
Accordingly, the Court upheld the decisions of Kentucky and Massachusetts
and overruled the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, stating, "We are asked to
create another [privilege] by interpreting the First Amendment to grant news-
men a testimonial privilege that other citizens do not enjoy. This we decline to
do." 4 The Court's rationale expressed a disfavor for creating new testimonial
privileges55 as well as a belief that society's best interest is served by a com-
prehensive grand jury trial. 6
The Court specifically addressed and rejected any notion of a "chilling ef-
fect" that the decision may have upon reporters. 7 The Court determined that
estimates on how its decision would affect the number of confidential sources
49 Branzburg published his first article that led to a subpoena in 1969 and his second in
1971, while the events surrounding Caldwell and Pappas both took place in 1970. Id. at
668-72.
50 id. at 668-77.
51 See cases cited supra note 27.
52 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682-83.
53 Id. at 690-91.
54 Id. at 690.
55 Id. at 690 n.29.
56 Id. at 701 ("When the grand jury is performing its investigatory function into a gen-
eral problem area ... society's interest is best served by a thorough and extensive investiga-
tion." (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 392 (1962))).
57 The Court did not use the specific term "chilling effect" but described and rejected
the general concept of the chilling effect. Id. at 693-94. The only time the term "chilling
effect" appears is as the title of a source cited in a footnote in Justice Stewart's dissent. Id. at




were speculative and therefore nearly impossible to prove." Further, the Court
questioned the credibility of the evidence that confidential sources would dry
up if reporters were not afforded protection because the evidence was provided
by reporters who were trying to preserve their own resources. 9 The Court also
suggested that if the story was important enough, the source could always seek
assistance from the proper public officials. 6 The majority rejected the idea of a
chilling effect, ultimately stating,
[W]e cannot accept the argument that the public interest in possible future news about
crime from undisclosed, unverified sources must take precedence over the public interest in
pursuing and prosecuting those crimes reported to the press by informants and in thus de-
terring the commission of such crimes in the future.61
The majority clearly found the importance of the public's right to address
criminal activity to be much more important than granting journalists any kind
of privilege. The Court also noted that it would be difficult for the lower courts
to define who counts as a journalist, stating, "Sooner or later, it would be nec-
essary to define categories of newsmen who qualified for the privilege, a ques-
tionable procedure in light of the traditional doctrine that liberty of the press is
the right of the lonely pamphleteer . . . just as much as of the large metropoli-
tan publisher .... ,62 This issue still looms large today, with the advent of non-
traditional forms of Intemet journalism such as blogs blurring the line of whom
should actually be treated as a journalist. 63
Additionally, while the Court acknowledged that several states have enacted
their own shield laws of varying degrees, it specifically remarked that "none
has been provided by federal statute."' The Court also observed that Congress
had considered several federal shields yet never enacted one.65 The Court's
effort to spell out all of the failed congressional proposals suggested a reluc-
tance to legislate a reporter's privilege from the bench when Congress would
not legislate the privilege itself. Thus, given a strict reading of the majority
58 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 693-94.
59 Id. at 694 ("It would be difficult to canvass the views of the informants themselves;
surveys of reporters on this topic are chiefly opinions of predicted informant behavior and
must be viewed in the light of the professional self-interest of the interviewees.").
60 Id. at 695.
61 Id. at 695.
62 Id. at 704.
63 A "blogger" is someone who posts a "web log" or an online diary on various topics
ranging from the blogger's personal life to politics. Louise Kehoe, Bloggers Slip the Surly
Bonds of Print, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 6, 2002, at 11.
64 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 689. At the time the Court wrote the opinion, seventeen states
had enacted a shield law, leading the Court to emphasize that the majority of states had not.
Id. at 689 n.27. If the Court were deciding this case today, the fact that a vast majority of
states have either a common law or statutory shield law on the books may have influenced
the outcome.
65 Id. at 689 n.28.
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opinion, a reporter has no right to confidentiality of sources.66
C. The Powell Concurrence-A Glimmer of Hope for Journalists
Justice Powell, the fifth swing vote for the majority, offered his own take on
a reporter's privilege.67 Though very brief, Powell's opinion has a much differ-
ent tone than the majority opinion, beginning with the opening sentence: "I add
this brief statement to emphasize what seems to me to be the limited nature of
the Court's holding."6 That he would limit the opinion from the outset is in-
dicative of his belief that the majority's rejection of any kind of reporter's
privilege is overly harsh.
The concurrence proceeds to state, "If a newsman believes that the grand
jury investigation is not being conducted in good faith he is not without rem-
edy."69 As part of this remedy, Powell proposed that the courts consider each
case on its merits via a motion to quash and that the "asserted claim to privi-
lege should be judged on its facts by the striking of a proper balance between
freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testi-
mony with respect to criminal conduct."7 This is a stark contrast to the major-
ity justices who specifically declined to grant any privilege.7 It is also notable
that the concurrence gives no guidance regarding the factors a court should
consider when striking this balance-Powell merely states that it should be
done.72
Many courts have seized upon the Powell concurrence to circumvent the
harsh reading of the majority opinion. 3 Indeed, a majority of courts follow
66 See McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 532 (7th Cir. 2003) ("[]t is evident from the
result in [Branzburg] that the interest of the press in maintaining the confidentiality of
sources is not absolute.").
67 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring).
68 Id. at 709.
69 Id. at 710.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 690.
72 See Richard Rosen, Comment, A Call for Legislative Response to New York's Narrow
Interpretation of the Newsperson's Privilege in Knight-Ridder Broadcasting Inc. v. Green-
burg, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 285, 308 (1988) ("[Powell's balancing test] has become a three-
part test which attempts to strike a balance among the relevance of the material sought, its
availability from alternative sources, and the importance of the harm potentially brought to
the press by compelled disclosure.").
73 See, e.g., LaRouche v. Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc., 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir. 1986)
(citing the Powell concurrence and stating that it is necessary for a district court to balance
the interests in deciding whether a journalist's privilege exists); see also Nancy V. Mate,
Comment, Piercing the Shield: Reporter Privilege in Minnesota Following State v. Turner,
82 MINN. L. REV. 1563, 1574 n.68 (1998) ("[N]ine out of the ten circuits that have addressed
the issue have interpreted Branzburg as recognizing a qualified First Amendment privilege
for journalists to resist compelled disclosure.").
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Powell's opinion instead of the majority opinion when faced with cases on this
point.74 Yet a minority of courts have not given reporters any additional source
protection,75 and these decisions have created the uproar that led to the calls for
a federal shield law.76
D. Branzburg Dissent: A Precursor to the Federal Shield Law
The dissent in Branzburg tracks recent arguments in favor of a federal shield
law, both in rationale and practicality.77 Written by Justice Stewart, the dissent
is extremely cognizant that the majority's opinion may bring a "chilling effect"
upon the field of journalism and is fearful that it will result in a diminished
ability of the press to function in its proper role." Justice Stewart further com-
mented, "Finally, and most important, when governmental officials possess an
unchecked power to compel newsmen to disclose information received in con-
fidence, sources will clearly be deterred from giving information, and reporters
will clearly be deterred from publishing it, because uncertainty about exercise
of the power will lead to 'self-censorship."' 79 Though the dissent does not ex-
plicitly refer to this as a chilling effect, it is in all practicality what Justice
Stewart is arguing, and is the same rationale used by current proponents of a
federal shield law.8"
Justice Stewart does not, however, propose an absolute privilege for journal-
ists.8 Instead, he creates an explicit balancing test-as opposed to Powell's
74 See Robert D. Lystad, Anatomy of a Federal Shield Law: The Legislative and Lobby-
ing Process, 23 A.B.A. COMM. L. 14 (2005) ("For more than thirty years, the overwhelming
majority of state and federal courts had read Branzburg as conferring a First Amendment
privilege, based largely on Justice Lewis Powell's concurring opinion.").
75 See, e.g., McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003). This case provides an
outstanding analysis of the differing ways in which Branzburg has been interpreted, noting
that many courts have accepted Powell's concurrence as the rule. Id. This court, however,
sides with the Branzburg majority, rejecting Powell's concurrence. Interestingly, the case
notes that Illinois has a state shield statute that is inapplicable because the matter is before a
federal court. The decision is indicative of the current trend of how courts have interpreted
Branzburg as of late. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 405 F.3d 17 (D.C.
Cir. 2005).
76 See Lystad, supra note 74, at 14 (suggesting that Judge Posner's opinion in McKevitt
was the genesis of the current federal shield law effort).
77 See Laurence B. Alexander & Ellen M. Bush, Shield Laws on Trial: State Court In-
terpretation of the Journalist's Statutory Privilege, 23 J. LEGIS. 215, 220 (1997) (noting that
many states that have a qualified shield law statute for journalists, as the proposed federal
shield law also offers, use the three-part test suggested in Justice Stewart's dissent).
78 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725 (1972) (Stewart J., dissenting).
79 Id. at 7 3 1.
80 See source cited supra note 20 (defining "chilling effect"); Editorial, Time for a Fed-
eral Shield Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2005, at A21 [hereinafter N.Y. Times Editorial] (argu-
ing that the "chilling effect" makes passage of a federal shield law essential).
81 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 739-40 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart notes that
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ambiguous test-that clearly leans towards establishing the rights of the jour-
nalist." Stewart's balancing test consists of three parts:
[In order to compel a journalist to testify, g]ovemmental officials must[ ] ... demonstrate
that the information sought is clearly relevant to a precisely defined subject of governmen-
tal inquiry. They must demonstrate that it is reasonable to think the witness in question has
that information. And they must show that there is not any means of obtaining the informa-
tion less destructive of First Amendment liberties.
83
The federal shield law proposed by the bi-partisan group of Senators and
Representatives is based very much on the same principles espoused in Stew-
art's balancing test.84 The government cannot compel a journalist's testimony
without meeting certain clear standards that show the information is so vital as
to outweigh the First Amendment rights of the journalist-rights which were
denied by the majority opinion.85 The dissent and the proposed federal shield
law are also similar since both place the burden upon the government of prov-
ing that a journalist should have to testify.86 In contrast, the majority, and even
Powell's concurrence, leaves the burden upon the subpoenaed journalist.87 The
drafters of the proposed shield law have sided with the Court's four justice
minority in the Branzburg case and seek to enact the minority opinion into law.
III. STATE SHIELD LAWS
Thirty-one states and the District of Columbia have enacted shield laws and
eighteen states have a common law equivalent. In order to get a sense of what
is typically included in a shield law, it will be useful to examine two state stat-
utes that are representative of the state shield law statutes. One of the statutes
the journalist's privilege is not absolute by stating, "When an investigation impinges on
First Amendment rights, the government must not only show that the inquiry is of 'compel-
ling and overriding importance' but it must also 'convincingly' demonstrate that the investi-
gation is 'substantially related' to the information sought." Id. By tacitly acknowledging that
investigations can impinge on First Amendment rights, Stewart thereby recognizes that the
privilege he proposes is not applicable in all circumstances. See id.
82 See id. at 728 ("[A] right to gather news, of some dimensions, must exist.").
83 Id. at 740 (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
84 See S. 1419, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005) (laying out "Conditions for Compelled Disclo-
sure" that include all elements of Stewart's balancing test).
85 Id. § 2(a).
86 See id. (stating that covered persons cannot be compelled to testify unless a court
determines that certain conditions have been met). Presumably, the evidence to compel such
testimony would come from the government. This.is similar to the dissent's balancing test
which states that government officials must demonstrate the relevance in order to compel
testimony. Cf Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 731 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
87 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 708 ("Grand juries are subject to judicial control and
subpoenas to motions to quash."). The burden to bring a motion to quash would therefore
rest upon the subject of the subpoena. See id. Justice Powell also points out that the journal-
ist has the ability to bring a motion to quash as a remedy. Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
88 See supra note II and accompanying text.
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provides an absolute privilege for journalists while the other provides a quali-
fied privilege.
A. Absolute Privilege: Complete Protection for a Narrow Class of Journalists
Pennsylvania is an example of a state shield law that provides an absolute
privilege89 to its reporters." The statute states:
No person engaged on, connected with, or employed by any newspaper of general circulation or
any press association or any radio or television station, or any magazine of general circulation,
for the purpose of gathering, procuring, compiling, editing or publishing news, shall be required
to disclose the source of any information procured or obtained by such person, in any legal pro-
ceeding, trial or investigation before any government unit. 9'
The only qualification that Pennsylvania provides to this rule is that televi-
sion and radio broadcasters must keep a copy of the actual broadcast on file for
one year after its original airdate.92 Therefore, in Pennsylvania, under no cir-
cumstances would a journalist ever be required to testify about his or her
source. Additionally, there is no requirement of confidentiality between the
reporter and his or her source in order for the statute to apply-all newsgather-
ing work is automatically protected. While a minority of states recognize an
absolute privilege,93 the majority of states recognize that circumstances could
arise where it could be vital to extract this information.94
It is important to note, however, the narrow definition of "journalist" in the
statute. Pennsylvania does not take up the "lonely pamphleteer" approach con-
templated in Branzburg v, Hayes,95 but instead limits protection to journalists
employed by a radio station, television station, or newspaper or magazine of
"general circulation." 96 This categorization is ambiguous at best, but does con-
vey the sense that a publication must be of some substance, be published regu-
89 An "absolute privilege" is defined as "[a] privilege that immunizes an actor from suit,
no matter how wrongful the action might be, and even though it is done with an improper
motive." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 20, at 1234.
90 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (West 2000).
91 Id. § 5942(a).
92 Id. § 5942(b). Case law connected with the statute reveals that in the case of radio and
television, only the material actually broadcast is subject to government use; outtakes are
privileged. See Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broad. & Cable, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 377, 383
(E.D. Pa. 1985).
93 See Campagnolo, supra note 26, at 450 (noting that nine states provide an absolute
privilege).
94 Id. at 450 ("Twenty-eight states provide by statute or caselaw for the possible disclo-
sure of media sources and information obtained from confidential sources ....").
95 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972) ("[T]he traditional doctrine that liberty
of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph
just as much as of the large metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest photocomposition
methods.").
96 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942(a).
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larly, and have a fairly wide readership.97 This narrow reading of the definition
of a journalist is necessary for a statute granting absolute privilege. If the stat-
ute has a wide definition of what is covered, then there is a large potential for
abuse,98 which hopefully is mitigated by narrowly tailoring a broad statute to a
specific group.99
Statutes such as this that grant absolute privilege were rejected by all three
levels of the Branzburg Court,"° as even the dissent proposed a balancing test
to determine if a journalist should be forced to reveal his or her sources, a test
that would not be necessary should an absolute privilege exist.'' The absolute
privilege, though viable at the state level, would not work on the federal level
where the stakes of national security are potentially much greater.
0 2
97 See Clay Calvert, And You Call Yourself a Journalist?: Wrestling With a Definition of
"Journalist" in the Law, 103 DICK. L. REV. 411,448 (1999) (referring to Pennsylvania's use
of "general circulation" as suggesting that the size of the audience and the content of the
publication are relevant to the determination of whether the publication qualifies for protec-
tion).
98 The Branzburg majority was concerned about a criminal's ability to hide behind a
sham press if a reporter's privilege was granted:
Such a privilege might be claimed by groups that set up newspapers in order to engage
in criminal activity and to therefore be insulated from grand jury inquiry .... It might
appear that such 'sham' newspapers would be easily distinguishable, yet the First
Amendment ordinarily prohibits courts from inquiring into the content of expression.
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 704 n.40.
99 See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942(a); see also ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (2005).
This statute provides another example of an absolute shield for journalists and, like the
Pennsylvania statute, also narrowly defines who is protected. The sweeping broadness of
absolute protection cannot be achieved without creating the specifically defined category of
protected persons.
100 See generally Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665. As discussed, the majority refused to extend
any kind of privilege to journalists, while the concurring opinion and dissent suggested ways
in which a journalist's privilege could become more palatable. See discussion supra Part
II.A.
101 See source cited supra note 89 (defining "absolute privilege").
102 "National security" is not defined in the proposed federal shield law. The term gener-
ally relates to national defense and foreign relations, though it is a nebulous term and the
definition can change to reflect varying circumstances. See David B. McGinty, The Statu-
tory and Executive Development of the National Security Exemption to Disclosure Under
the Freedom of Information Act: Past and Future, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 67, 80 (2005) (noting
that the definitions offered by the government of "national security" are only slightly more
helpful than no definition at all).
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B. Qualified Privilege on the State Level Presents a Model for the Federal
Shield Law
The majority of states that have enacted shield legislation for journalists 3
only provide a qualified privilege. 4 These statutes resemble the proposed fed-
eral shield law, which grants a qualified, not absolute, privilege to journalists.
Consequently, these state statutes provide a greater basis of comparison to the
proposed federal law. While the terms of the statutes vary greatly,"5 the North
Carolina shield law is a representative of a statute providing a qualified privi-
lege. 
0 6
The North Carolina statute provides journalists with a "qualified privilege
against disclosure . . . of any confidential or nonconfidential information,
document or item obtained or prepared while acting as a journalist."'0 7 Of note
in this clause is that the privilege extends to both confidential and nonconfi-
dential sources, much as the Pennsylvania statute does.' 0 The term "journalist"
is defined as "[a]ny person, company, or entity, or the employees, independent
contractors, or agents of that person, company, or entity, engaged in the busi-
ness of gathering, compiling, writing, editing, photographing, recording, or
processing information for dissemination via any news medium."'0 9 This defi-
nition is overly broad since, through the "agents" clause, it includes all persons
remotely connected with a news agency for "business""' to publish their re-
ports. This definition would certainly include "bloggers""' who can write al-
most anything they want. The fact that bloggers are "writing" and generating
revenues from their website "publications" brings them within the protection
103 See Campagnolo, supra note 26, at 450 (citing twenty-eight states that have dealt with
media source disclosure either by statute or case law).
104 A "qualified privilege" is defined as "[a] privilege that immunizes an actor from suit
only when the privilege is properly exercised in the performance of a legal or moral duty."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 20, at 1235.
105 For instance, some statutes provide for a balancing test. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §
90.5015 (1999) (enumerating three elements necessary to overcome the privilege). Others
provide absolute privilege for confidential news and a qualified privilege with a balancing
test for non-confidential news. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(b)-(c) (McKinney
1992).
106 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.11(c) (2005).
107 Id. § 8-53.11 (b).
1o8 See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5942 (West 2000).
109 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.1 l(a)(1) (emphasis added). The statute later defines "news
medium" as "[a]ny entity regularly engaged in the business of publication or distribution of
news via print, broadcast or other electronic means accessible to the general public." Id § 8-
53. 11 (b)(3).
110 Though the term "business" is certainly ambiguous, in this Comment it will mean
"[a] commercial enterprise carried on for profit." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 20,
at 211.
I Kehoe, supra note 63 (defining bloggers).
20061
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
of the North Carolina shield law." 2 This issue will be discussed further in the
context of the federal shield law."3
Another intriguing part of the North Carolina shield statute is the balancing
test necessary for the journalist to be compelled to testify in a legal proceed-
ing." 14 The balancing test included in the statute mirrors the essential philoso-
phy of the balancing test that the dissent provided in Branzburg, with the ex-
ception that the language in the North Carolina statute is more broad so as to
apply to civil as well as criminal disputes." 5
Yet perhaps the most noteworthy part of the statute, and something that goes
unmentioned in the proposed federal shield law, is the language providing that
"a journalist has no privilege against disclosure of any information, document
or item obtained as the result of the journalist's eyewitness observations of
criminal or tortious conduct.""' 6 The statute in one way seems to support the
majority decision in Branzburg, where all of the reporters were eyewitnesses to
an illegal act and were forced to testify about it, and at the same time supports
the dissent by using the essence of the balancing test laid out therein.
The state shield law statutes struggle, as we will see, with many of the same
problems as the proposed federal shield law. However, by picking and choos-
ing the best parts of various state shield law statutes, Congress can enact a fair
and balanced federal shield law.
IV. THE PROPOSED FEDERAL SHIELD LAW: PROTECTING THE
COUNTRY AND THE PRESS
A. A Federal Shield Law Will Protect Journalists Who Have Come Under
Increased Pressure to Divulge Confidential Sources
Recently, the American Bar Association ("ABA") noted the fact that report-
ers are receiving more subpoenas to testify about their confidential sources."7
As noted in the ABA Journal:
112 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.1 (a)()-(3). To date, no case has been brought in North
Carolina or any other state challenging whether "bloggers" are covered persons in state
shield laws.
113 See discussion infra Part IV.B.i.
114 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.11(c) (establishing the test necessary to "overcome the
qualified privilege").
115 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 733-34 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting). In the
Branzburg dissent, Justice Stewart refers to those forcing the journalist to testify as "the
government" while the North Carolina statute refers to "any person seeking to compel."
Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.11 (c), with Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 734.
116 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.1 1(d).
117 Wendy N. Davis, The Squeeze on the Press: More Courts Are Forcing Reporters to
Testify As Judges Reconsider Media Privilege, 91 A.B.A. J. 23 (2005).
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For more than 30 years, federal courts generally have been deferential toward journalists
when it came to having them testify about information learned while reporting. But over
the last year, the tide appears to have turned. In a series of well-publicized cases, journalists
from major media have been held in contempt of court for refusing to testify before grand
juries .... Five reporters-from the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, CNN, the As-
sociated Press and the Washington Post-were held in contempt last year [2004] .. .and
fined $500 a day for declining to reveal sources who gave them information [about a gov-
emnment scientist suing the government for violating his privacy rights.],8
When the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit's decision of
McKevitt v. Pallasch ruled against the reporter's right to special protections,"9
it opened a floodgate of litigation in federal courts with a rising tide of holding
journalists in contempt. 2 ° Given the Seventh Circuit decision, journalists are in
danger of being more exposed now than ever before, creating the need for a
federal shield law.
Wendy N. Davis points out that the proposed federal shield law is far from
the first attempt by Congress to pass a federal shield law, noting that "[n]inety-
nine separate bills were introduced between 1973 and 1978" that did not suc-
ceed because media advocates "disagreed about what the bills should in-
clude."'2 The situation has changed, however, and journalists appear united in
an effort to pass the pending federal shield legislation.'22 Numerous newspapers
around the country have published articles and editorials in support of a federal
shield law,'23 many of which seem to indicate that such a law would be in keep-
ing with the journalist's code of ethics.'24 The Radio-Television News Direc-
tors Association ("RTNDA"), for example, has adopted the policy that profes-
sional electronic journalists, including "bloggers," should "[i]dentify sources
whenever possible. Confidential sources should be used only when it is clearly
in the public interest to gather or convey important information or when a per-
son providing information might be harmed. Journalists should keep all com-
118 Id.
119 McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 535 (7th Cir. 2003).
120 See sources cited supra notes 74-75.
121 Davis, supra note 117, at 23.
122 See, e.g., Mark Fitzgerald, Unanimous Cal. Assembly Vote Urges Federal Shield
Law, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Aug. 30, 2005,
http://www.cfac.org/Attachments/evans shield.htm. The article, published in a newspaper
trade publication, reports that the "resolution is sponsored by the California Newspaper
Publishers Association, and supported by the American Civil Liberties Union, the California
First Amendment Coalition, Californians Aware, and the Planning and Conservation
League." Id.
123 See, e.g., Nathan Seigel, Our History of Media Protection, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2005,
at A17; Dale Harrison, Editorial, Alabama Must Repair Its Shield for Press, BIRMINGHAM
NEWS, Aug. 28, 2005, at 4B; Tim Rutten, Regarding Media: Reporter Freed But Case Isn't
Closed, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2005, at EO1.
124 See, e.g., Editorial, The President's Man; Advisor Karl Rove's Role Draws Suspicion
and White House Should Stop Stonewalling, BUFFALO NEWS, July 16, 2005, at A6 (citing
Judith Miller's choice to go to jail over revealing her source as a "principled refusal").
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mitments to protect a confidential source."'25 The constitution of the American
Society of Newspaper Editors ("ASNE") similarly espouses that "[p]ledges of
confidentiality to news sources must be honored at all costs, and therefore
should not be given lightly."' 2
In addition to arguing that the federal shield law would protect a journalist's
ethical duty, proponents of the federal shield law argue time and time again
that without it, the "chilling effect" found in the Branzburg v. Hayes dissent
will become widespread throughout the nation and hurt the press' news report-
ing ability. The Oregonian, for example, argues that sending Judith Miller to
jail has "chill[ed] reporters and sources throughout the nation." '27 Matthew
Cooper, a reporter for Time magazine, testified that "[i]f journalists routinely
promise anonymity and routinely are forced to break those promises, this will,
indeed, create a general chilling effect on leaks. '128 William Safire, a noted
political columnist for the New York Times, comments that:
[T]here is a more specific chilling effect taking place right now. It imposes a mental prior
restraint on the gathering of news and the expression of opinion. I have always been able to
write what I've learned and what I believe without "fear or favor," in the Times' phrase,




It is not surprising that journalists are testifying to the fact that there has
been a "chilling effect," but the Branzburg majority required more, indicating
that without some empirical data it would be difficult to verify the "chilling
effect":
Estimates of the inhibiting effect of such subpoenas on the willingness of informants to
make disclosures to newsmen are widely divergent and to a great extent speculative. It
would be difficult to canvass the views of the informants themselves; surveys of reporters
on this topic are chiefly opinions of predicted informant behavior and must be viewed in
the light of the professional self-interest of the interviewees.
130
However, the first signs of empirical data to support the claim of a chilling
effect are appearing. Time magazine Editor-in-Chief Norman Pearlstein testi-
fied before the Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing that after agreeing to turn
over subpoenaed confidential materials to prosecutors, "[s]ome of [my report-
ers] showed me e-mails and letters from valuable sources who insisted that
125 Radio-Television News Directors Association, Code of Ethics (2000),
http://www.rtnda.org/ethics/coe.shtml (emphasis added).
126 American Society of Newspaper Editors, Statement of Principles art. VI (1996),
http://www.asne.org/kiosk/archive/principl.htm (emphasis added).
127 Editorial, Pass Federal Shield Law, OREGONIAN, July 25, 2005, at B06.
128 Senate Hearing, supra note 14, at 9 (testimony of Matthew Cooper, White House
Correspondent, Time Magazine); see also id. (testimony of Norman Pearlstine, Editor-In-
Chief, Time, Inc.) (arguing that the current conditions in which journalists find themselves
chills the newsgathering ability of his staff).
129 Id. at 12 (testimony of William Safire, Columnist, New York Times).
130 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693-94 (1972) (footnote omitted).
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they no longer trusted the magazine. The chilling effect is obvious."' 3
Perhaps the most startling evidence of the chilling effect comes from Cleve-
land. In June 2005, the editor of the Cleveland Plain Dealer issued an editorial
in which he stated that:
As I write this, two stories of profound importance languish in our hands. The public would
be well served to know them, but both are based on documents leaked to us by people who
would face deep trouble for having leaked them. Publishing the stories would almost cer-
tainly lead to a leak investigation and the ultimate choice: talk or go to jail. Because talking
isn't an option and jail is too high a price to pay, these two stories will go untold for now.
How many more are out there?1
32
Almost all examples of the chilling effect point either to the fact that sources
will no longer feel secure revealing information without the guarantee of con-
fidentiality, which could limit the amount of vital information available to the
press, or that the journalist will be hesitant to address certain topics for fear of
being subpoenaed.'33 In this instance a newspaper effectively "chilled" itself;
the lack of confidential sources was not the problem, the issue was one of an
editorial board protecting its journalists from potential jail time.'34 A new era
has dawned, different from the ones in which attempts at federal shield laws
were made in the past; there is now actual evidence of the public being denied
access to important information because of the lack of a federal shield law.
B. Examining the Proposed Federal Shield Law
The proposed federal shield law, officially named the Free Flow of Informa-
tion Act of 2005, " ' protects journalists from revealing their sources in federal
investigations. The bill contains certain exceptions, such as in the case of im-
minent national security threats.'36 This Comment will examine different sec-
tions of the bill and discuss the relative merits of each section and suggest
changes to the bill that would make it more precise and sensitive to the unique
issues that the federal government faces.
131 Senate Hearing, supra note 14, at 10 (testimony of Norman Pearlstine, Editor-In-
Chief, Time, Inc.).
132 Doug Clifton, Jailing Reporters, Silencing the Whistleblowers, CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER, June 30, 2005, at B9.
133 For instance, David Westin, President of ABC News, comments, "[The chilling ef-
fect] certainly, I'm sorry to say, is a factor that we talk about and take into active considera-
tion as part of the editorial process." Reporter's Privilege Legislation: Hearing Before the S.
Judiciary Comm., 109th Cong. 23 (2005) [hereinafter Second Senate Hearing] (testimony of
David Westin, President, ABC News).
'34 See N.Y. Times Editorial, supra note 80 (discussing the Cleveland Plain Dealer's
stance that "[j]ail is too high a price to pay" for a reporter doing a story).
135 S. 1419, 109th Cong. (2005).
136 Id. § 2(a)(3)(A).
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i. Who Should Be Protected Under the Statute?
The most important definition in the bill is the term "covered person." The
"covered person" is essentially the journalist; however, this definition is not as
straightforward as it appears. The current version of the bill begins with cover-
ing "an entity," which can include both businesses, teams of journalists, or an
individual publisher.'37 To be covered under the definition, the entity must
"disseminate information by print, broadcast, cable, satellite, mechanical, pho-
tographic, electronic or other means."' 38 This definition is very broad, encom-
passing almost all forms of publishing.'39
In addition to the condition listed above, the entity must be one that "pub-
lishes a newspaper, book, magazine, or other periodical in print or electronic
form."' o This is a very important change from the original version of the bill,
in which the language does not include the italicized portion above. 4 ' This po-
tentially opens the door for many interpretations of who could be covered un-
der the legislation. This is a shortcoming of the proposed law because it could
lead to different definitions of who is covered in different circuits throughout
the country instead of creating a uniform approach nationwide.
Senator Cornyn raised this point at the Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing
on the proposed bill by asking the panel of experts about whether the bill
should protect "bloggers,"'4 2 who under the definition of "covered person"
would be protected as they disseminate news in an electronic format.'43 Wil-
liam Safire pointed out that there are between nine to ten million bloggers and
that a line must be drawn somewhere.'" Would excluding bloggers mean
eliminating sources such as the Drudge Report?4 ' Safire mentioned potential
criteria for defining a covered person could include regularity and those in the
business of disseminating the news.'46 However, he points out his belief that,
'37 See H.R. 581, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005). This bill was modified in several ways. See
discussion Part IV.B.ii.
138 S. 1419 § 5(2)(A).
139 See Lystad, supra note 74, at 16 ("[The bill] would cover publishers, broadcasters,
and wire services, and those who work for them. The definition of journalist would include
freelance journalists who are working for a publisher or broadcaster but not those journalists
without contracts.").
140 S. 1419 § 5(2)(A)(i) (emphasis added).
141 H.R. 581 § 7(1)(A)(i).
142 Senate Hearing, supra note 14, at 18 (testimony of Sen. John Cornyn, Member, S.
Judiciary Comm.).
'43 See Lystad, supra note 74, at 16 ("Bloggers are not explicitly mentioned and thus
likely would have to fall under [a named] category in order to be afforded the law's protec-
tion.").
144 Senate Hearing, supra note 14, at 18 (testimony of William Safire, Columnist, New
York Times).
145 Drudge Report, http://drudgereport.com (last visited Oct. 1, 2005).
146 Senate Hearing, supra note 14, at 18 (testimony of William Safire, Columnist, New
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"the lonely pamphleteer has the same rights as the New York Times."' 47
The U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ"), which opposed the bill at both
Senate hearings, 48 also notes the weakness in the bill's definition of "covered
person," stating that it is concerned that the term could be applied to corpora-
tions outside of the United States that pose a threat to national security.49 The
DOJ further speculates that the term, as written, could be even more inclusive,
contending that the bill "could also be read broadly to include any supermar-
ket, department store, or other business that periodically publishes a products
catalog, sales pamphlet, or even a listing of registered customers."'50
The DOJ's position that a foreign media company, such as Al Jazeera, could
fall under this definition of "covered person" thus posing a threat to national
security has merit. Extending the same coverage to catalog and sales pam-
phlets, however, is an overstatement. 5' Yet, the DOJ is correct in that the lan-
guage defining "covered person" is not entirely clear or narrowly tailored. For
this bill to be effective as a tool to protect those who are most in need, and to
eliminate abuse, the terms of the "covered person" must be more precise. The
issue of drafting proper boundaries for a "covered person" is not new--each of
the states that passed a shield law necessarily defined the terms of who it in-
tends to cover.
New York's state shield law'52 provides a good example of pinpointing those
covered by the law. The law provides protection for "professional journalists,"
which is a better working standard than simply anyone who disseminates in-
formation.'53 The statute defines "professional journalist" as follows:
York Times).
147 Id.
148 See id. (statement of James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of
Justice); Second Senate Hearing, supra note 133, at 3-4 (statement of Chuck Rosenberg,
U.S. Attorney, Southern District of Texas). Comey did not actually appear at the original
Senate hearing, but instead submitted a written statement summarizing the position of the
DOJ on the original version of the bill, which was not current when the hearing took place.
Rosenberg did appear at the second Senate hearing on the topic and also submitted a written
statement further outlining the DOJ's views in response to the current version of the bill.
149 Second Senate Hearing, supra note 133, at 8-9 (2005) (statement of Chuck
Rosenberg, U.S. Attorney, Southern District of Texas).
150 Id. at 8.
151 See generally Randall P. Bezanson, The Developing Law of Editorial Judgment, 78
NEB. L. REV. 754 (1999). Bezanson suggests that editorial judgment is a hallmark of what
defines "the press." Using this standard, catalogs and other such works that are largely com-
prised of lists would not be considered covered under the proposed bill because they do not
reflect "editorial judgment." It is difficult to imagine a judge hearing this issue deciding that
a catalog constitutes a covered person under the bill given the legislative history attached to
it.
152 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1992).
153 See Jeffrey Rosen, Overcharged, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 14, 2005, at 14 (commenting
that the term "professional journalist" is useful in a shield law because, without it, any per-
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"Professional journalist" shall mean one who, for gain or livelihood, is engaged in
gathering, preparing, collecting, writing, editing, filming, taping or photographing of news
intended for a newspaper, magazine, news agency, press association or wire service or
other professional medium which has as one of its regular functions the processing and re-
searching of news intended for dissemination to the public; such person shall be someone
performing said function either as a regular employee or as one otherwise professionally
affiliated for gain or livelihood with such medium of communication.154
This definition is particularly effective because of the phrase "or other pro-
fessional medium."' 5 Under this definition, bloggers who were engaged in
legitimate professional journalism but use the web as their method of publica-
tion would be protected, however the protection would not extend to the
masses of bloggers,'56 saving the effectiveness from the shield law from being
diluted. "'
It is important to note that the statute does not stand in a vacuum, but rather
is subject to judicial interpretation."' By providing language that is precise, yet
inclusive, such as that encompassed in the New York statute, the language en-
ables a court to make reasonable fact-specific determinations about whom ex-
actly should be covered should the situation arise.'59 This would aid both jour-
nalists, who would know when and why they were covered, as well as law en-
forcement officials, who would know when a journalist would be immune
son who wanted to avoid testifying before a grand jury could just start their own blog).
154 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(a)(6).
155 Id.
156 See Lystad, supra note 74, at 18 ("Numerous members of Congress clearly indicated
that a shield law that explicitly protected all bloggers would never pass. Whether a particu-
lar blog qualifies as a magazine or an electronic periodical would determine whether the
person receives the act's protection. That decision would be left to the courts.").
157 For a thoughtful analysis on why the definition of a journalist should be limited, par-
ticularly to exclude bloggers, see Laurence B. Alexander, Looking Out for Watchdogs: A
Legislative Proposal Limiting the Newsgathering Privilege to Journalists in the Greatest
Need of Protection for Sources and Information, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 97 (2002). But
see Linda L. Berger, Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process of Journalism to Protect the
Journalist' Privilege in an Infinite Universe of Publication, 39 Hous. L. REV. 1371 (2003).
Berger rebuts Alexander's claims, specifically disputing the point that bloggers should not
be covered along with other "traditional" journalists and arguing that journalism should be
based on factors such as distribution and the gathering and processing of information. Id.
158 See Lystad, supra note 74, at 18 ("[T]he language would grant discretion to the court
to determine whether freelance journalists who were not yet working 'for' a covered entity,
either by contract or an informal agreement, would be covered.").
159 Case law demonstrates that the definition included in the New York statute has been
helpful in allowing judges to separate those covered by the shield law from those who are
not. See, e.g., Am. Say. Bank, FSB v. UBS Paine Webber (In re Fitch), 330 F.3d 104 (2d
Cir. 2003). In this case, a bank sought to discover communications between a broker and a
rating firm. The rating firm claimed protection under the New York shield law because it
had conducted research, fact gathering, and analysis of data and posted it on its website for
the general public. The court applied the statutory definition of "professional journalist" to
determine that the employee did not meet the standard of professional journalist and there-




ii. Conditions for Compelled Disclosure-Is "Imminence" Really Necessary?
Under the proposed law, the government cannot compel a covered person to
testify or produce documentation in any issue arising under federal law unless
very specific conditions are met. One of the first requirements is that the "cov-
ered person" is "provid[ed] notice and an opportunity to be heard" in court. 6 '
This important step grants journalists due process by enabling them to present
to the judge reasons why they should not be required to divulge confidential
information before disclosing his or her source.'62
Second, the government must prove that they have no other way to obtain
the information than from the covered person.'63 Additionally, (I) in the case of
a criminal investigation, the government must prove that there is reasonable
ground to show a crime has been committed and that the reporter's testimony
is essential to the investigation; or (2) in the case of a matter other than a
criminal investigation, that the information the covered person provides "is
essential to a dispositive issue of substantial importance to that matter."'
64
These alone would impose a roadblock to interrogating journalists, but the
strength of the bill (from a journalist's standpoint) comes in the third provision.
This states that where the identity of a source of information would reasonably
be revealed through such testimony, the disclosure must be necessary to "pre-
vent imminent and actual harm to national security... and the harm sought to
be redressed by requiring disclosure clearly outweighs the public interest in
protecting the freeflow of information."'65 This is a substantial burden for the
government to overcome. The statute presumes (and therefore the court must
also presume) that the "free flow of information" is in the public interest.'66
160 See discussion infra Part IV.C for the Author's complete proposed version of the
federal shield law, which incorporates the New York "professional journalist" standard.
161 S. 1419, 109th Cong. § 2(a) (2005).
162 See Senate Hearing, supra note 14, at 17 (testimony of William Safire, Columnist,
New York Times) ("What do judges do? They strike a balance. They say, how important is
this testimony, and can we get it from someplace else? They recognize the importance of the
first amendment and the protection of the First Amendment, the right of the free press help
the flow of news. At the same time, you're not going to put somebody in jail, because
there's no other way of getting the information except from a reporter. So this is something
that judges do every day.").
163 S. 1419 § 2(a)(1).
'6 Id. § 2(a)(2)(B).
165 Id. § 2(a)(3)(A)-(C) (emphasis added).
166 This language is reflective of the bill's sponsors beliefs. See Senate Hearing, supra
note 14, at 3 (testimony of Sen. Richard Lugar, Chairman, S. Foreign Relations Comm.) ("I
believe that the free flow of information is an essential element of democracy. In order for
the United States to foster the spread of freedom and democracy globally, it is incumbent
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This phrase in and of itself essentially voids the Branzburg v. Hayes decision,
which held that the public interest in compelling reporters to testify before a
grand jury outweighed the public interest of a free flow of information.'67 The
further requirement that the issue must be one of "imminent and actual harm to
national security" in order to compel testimony places the journalist almost
beyond reproach. This language is not found in the original draft of the bill, 168
which gave even more expansive protection to journalists.
The original bill contained a section entitled "Compelled Disclosure Prohib-
ited," which provides that though a testimony or document could be compelled
by (1) a proper showing that a crime had been committed; (2) that the informa-
tion was vital to a matter of substantial importance; or (3) that the information
was unavailable elsewhere; the identity of a source of information could not be
compelled.'69 This section was likely deleted so as to remove the situation
where the journalist could not be compelled to reveal their source even in ex-
treme cases. 7 The drafters compromised by making an "imminent and actual
harm to national security" requirement.' However, the "imminent and actual"
language prevents the bill, as currently written, from being viable because it
creates too great a burden on the government before any journalist could be
compelled to reveal information.
Senator Lugar, during his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee
stated, "The national security exception and continued strict standards relating
to classified information will ensure that reporters are protected while main-
taining an avenue for prosecution and disclosure when considering the defense
of our country."'72 Senator Dodd, in his testimony, answers the objection that
the national security exception is too broad by saying;
If that is so, then wouldn't we expect to see great threats to public safety in those states that
have shield laws, which are at least as protective as the shield law that we propose? Indi-
ana, which my colleague, Senator Lugar, has already mentioned, has an absolute protection
for reporters from having to reveal any information in court.
Senator Lugar and Congressman Pence will correct me if I'm wrong, I'm sure, but I am
unaware that Indiana is beset with any unusual lack of public safety relative to other states.
Moreover if this legislation is harmful to law enforcement, as the Justice Department sug-
gests, then why did 34 state attorneys general submit an amicus brief to the Supreme Court
that we first support an open and free press nationally here at home.").
167 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690-91, 695, 697-98, 705-06 (1972).
168 H.R. 581, 109th Cong. § 5 (2005).
169 Id. §§ 2, 4.
170 See Lystad, supra note 74, at 17 ("Ultimately the sponsors made several revisions [to
the original bill], the most critical being Section 4, which would have provided an absolute
privilege against disclosure of confidential sources.").
171 Compare H.R. 581 § 4 (providing an absolute privilege for journalists), with S. 1419,
109th Cong. § 2(a) (2005) (spelling out the conditions necessary for compelled testimony).




in the Miller and Cooper case, essentially arguing for a federal shield law along the lines of
what we have drafted.1
73
This argument, while tenable, is not persuasive. The DOJ states that because
it is charged with "unique responsibilities to protect the national security and to
safeguard our nation's secrets, the fact that there may be a state privilege
doesn't quite answer the question of whether there should be a federal privi-
lege.' 74 The DOJ correctly argues that security concerns on the state and fed-
eral level are not comparable. The federal government, in dealing with issues
of national security, grapples with issues more complicated, sinister, and
threatening than any state deals with itself. 75 It is not a valid comparison to
hold the public safety concerns of Indiana up to the national security concerns
of the entire United States in a post September 11 th-era.
Safire, in defending the cause of the bill, stated during questioning that re-
porters are not looking for an absolute privilege. 176 Safire asserts that the "im-
minent danger" requirement is an exception to the privilege. He believes the
requirement would respect the press' right to confidentiality and would not
require the press to become the government's own investigative source.'77
Senator Feinstein disagreed with the use of this language, stating, "this would
mean basically there's no ability to compel anything-I couldn't conceive of a
case where under this statute information could be received.' 78
The bill would become more acceptable to everyone, including the DOJ, if
the word "imminent" were removed.'79 It is not difficult to imagine a situation
where a reporter gains information about a potential terrorist plot with no spe-
cific timeframe and cannot be forced to identify a source due to the lack of
imminence. With this new formulation, the government would still have the
burden of proving the disclosure was necessary "to prevent actual harm to na-
tional security." Such a burden would still require a substantial showing by the
government, but it would be less stringent than the burden necessary to prove
173 Id. at 6 (testimony of Sen. Christopher Dodd).
171 Second Senate Hearing, supra note 133, at 9 (statement of Chuck Rosenberg, U.S.
Attorney, Southern District of Texas).
175 See, e.g., Editorial, Federal Shield Law Needed, RENO GAZETrE-J., July 24, 2005, at
8A ("[T]he Justice Department, Homeland Security and intelligence agencies have legiti-
mate concerns about national security and fighting terrorism.").
176 Senate Hearing, supra note 14, at 17 (testimony of William Safire, Columnist, New
York Times).
177 Id.
178 Id. at 20 (testimony of Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Member, S. Judiciary Comm.).
179 The DOJ is particularly concerned with the use of the word "imminent." The DOJ's
position is that "the test for a national security case would be imminent actual harm. If we
could not show that that leak was imminent actual harm, we may not be able to reach it
through this bill. In other words, it may be off-limits even though a crime." Second Senate
Hearing, supra note 133, at 12 (statement of Chuck Rosenberg, U.S. Attorney, Southern
District of Texas). Thus if the word were removed then one of the DOJ's main issues with
the bill would be eliminated.
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that the threat is "imminent."' 8 °
Section 2 of the bill requires that the context of any forced disclosure must
be narrowly tailored to the subject matter and time period and is limited to,
"verifying published information or describing any surrounding circumstances
relevant to the accuracy of such published information."'' This language is too
narrow; it leaves the government helpless to compel disclosure of an unpub-
lished tip, even if the imminent and actual harm standards are met. If "pub-
lished" were expanded simply to "published or planned be published," it would
give the government the right to seek information from journalists that is in the
best interest of the nation but had yet to be published. This would not deprive
journalists of their limited privilege because the government would still have to
meet its national security burden before a judge, affording the journalist proce-
dural due process.'82
With this expansion comes the potential issue of prior restraint. Prior re-
straint is defined as "[a] governmental restriction on speech or publication be-
fore its actual expression" which in most cases is unconstitutional under the
First Amendment.'83 The meaning of "planned to be published," therefore must
be clearly defined to mean that the story is in its final edited form in place to be
published in the news organization's next publication. This would avoid prior
restraint in two ways. First, there is no mandate anywhere that the information
cannot be published. The news organization is still free to disseminate the
story, thus the organization really has not been "restrained" from anything.
Second, the other qualifications for the compelled disclosure ensure that this
would happen only in extreme circumstances of national security.'84 Finally,
the Judith Miller case shows that journalists can be compelled to reveal a
source without having written anything at all-prior restraint was not an is-
sue.1
8 5
180 All of the remaining procedures prescribed in the proposed bill would still apply ex-
cept for the "imminent" requirement. This allows a judge to use a balancing test to deter-
mine the level of need. S. 1419, 109th Cong. § 2(a) (2005).
M81 Id. § 2(b)(1)-(2) (emphasis added).
182 Id. § 2(a).
183 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 20, at 1232.
184 It is worth noting that "[flreedom of speech and press, historically considered and
taken up by the Federal Constitution, means principally, although not exclusively, immunity
from previous restraints or censorship." 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 454 (2002).
The point of the federal shield law is to augment First Amendment protections, not to de-
crease them. Therefore it is important that the prior restraint does not become an issue which
eliminates the effectiveness of the federal shield law.
185 See discussion infra Part VI. The expanded definition of "planned to be published" is
noted in the Author's proposed version of the federal shield law.
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iii. Compelled Disclosure from Third Parties
Another section of the bill deals with the government's ability to obtain a
reporter's confidential information by subpoenaing "communications service
provider[s]. ' '86 The bill's definition of "communications service provider" en-
compasses those persons who transmit information electronically and those
companies whose job it is to convey information from one person to another.
87
Entities that would fall under this discussion include network servers and elec-
tronic databases where e-mails and other documents would be stored. Addi-
tionally, the definition encompasses telecommunications carriers, or wireless
and wireline phone companies.'88
The section makes clear that the same procedures that apply to extracting in-
formation from the covered person also apply to accessing their communica-
tions records.'89 The section further provides that the only way the government
can access this information is by providing the covered person with due proc-
ess-notice and a right to be heard.9 There is an exception to the notice re-
quirement, however, where a court finds "by clear and convincing evidence"
that notice would "pose a substantial threat to the integrity of a criminal inves-
tigation."''
The DOJ objects to this section because it "ends the ability of law en-
forcement authorities to conduct any investigation involving third parties."'
92
186 S. 1419 § 4.
187 Id.; see also Lystad, supra note 74, at 17-18 ("[T]he Act makes it clear that these
procedures, much like the guidelines, would apply only to communications or records of
covered persons rather than the records of all companies doing business with covered per-
sons.").
188 In defining "Communication Service Provider," the proposed bill references defini-
tions contained in the Communications Act of 1934 for the terms, "telecommunications
carrier, an information service provider and an information content provider." S. 1419 §
5(1). The Communications Act of 1934 defines these terms as follows:
The term "information service" means the offering of a capability for generating, ac-
quiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available in-
formation via telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not in-
clude any use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a
telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications service.
47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2000).
"The term 'telecommunications carrier' means any provider of telecommunications services
.... .Id. § 153(44). The Act defines "telecommunications" as "the transmission, between or
among points specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without change in
the form or content of the information as sent and received." Id. § 153(43). "The term 'in-
formation content provider' means any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in
part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any
other interactive computer service." Id. § 230(f)(3).
189 S. 1419 § 4(a).
190 Id. §4(b).
191 Id. § 4(c).
192 Senate Hearing, supra note 14, at 5 (statement of James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney
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The DOJ then offers the hypothetical that "a ransom demand made to a kidnap
victim's family's home telephone could be investigated by compulsory proc-
ess; a ransom demand made by an anonymous person to a media outlet could
not be investigated by such compulsory process." '93
This hypothetical is unrealistic. Subsections 4(b) and 4(c) spell out situa-
tions where a communications source can be subpoenaed and effectively used.
'14 Section 4 merely provides covered parties with notice and the opportunity to
be heard. If Congress is going so far as to recognize that the free flow of in-
formation is in the public interest, as they recognized in § 2 of the bill, then
Congress clearly feels that the procedural due process right of the covered
party is worth protecting." 5 Section 4 does not end all possibility of investiga-
tion, it simply lets the affected party know that he or she is under investigation.
The DOJ's hypothetical overstates the potential problem. As it admits,
"[M]edia outlets are often happy to provide certain types of non-sensitive in-
formation to the Federal government, but are more comfortable doing so in
response to a subpoena."' 96 While the DOJ's objective in making that statement
was to show that it would be more difficult to obtain a subpoena,'97 it neverthe-
less assuages its own fears that with the process in place, media stations would
almost certainly aid in an investigation involving non-sensitive sources. It is
truly hard to imagine a media outlet not wishing to aid the government in cap-
turing a kidnapper. This hypothetical is overblown and the section, as is, pro-
vides the proper procedures and mechanisms to allow both the covered person
and the DOJ to do their jobs.
C. Author's Proposed Shield Law
The text below constitutes the Author's proposed shield law with changes
incorporated. This proposal addresses the weaknesses of the bill entitled the
Free Flow of Information Act and proposes changes to make the law more pal-
atable for the federal government while maintaining strong protection for jour-
nalists.
General, U.S. Department of Justice).
193 Id. This hypothetical was offered again by U.S. Attorney Rosenberg in his written
statement as well. Id. (statement of Chuck Rosenberg, U.S. Attorney, Southern District of
Texas).
194 S. 1419 § 4(b)-(c) (stating that in some situations the covered party need not receive
notice); id. § 4(c).
"' Id. § 2(a)(3)(C).
196 See Senate Hearing, supra note 14, at 3 (statement of James B. Comey, Deputy At-




To maintain the free flow of information to the public by providing condi-
tions for the federally compelled disclosure of information by certain persons
connected with the news media.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the 'Free Flow of Information Act of 2005'.
SECTION 2. CONDITIONS FOR COMPELLED DISCLOSURE.
(a) Conditions for Compelled Disclosure-A Federal entity may not compel
a covered person to testify or produce any document in any proceeding or in
connection with any issue arising under Federal law unless a court deter-
mines by clear and convincing evidence, after providing notice and an op-
portunity to be heard to the covered person-
(I) that the party seeking to compel production of such testimony or
document has unsuccessfully attempted to obtain such testimony or
document from all persons from which such testimony or document
could reasonably be obtained other than a covered person;
(2) that-
(A) in a criminal investigation or prosecution, based on information
obtained from a person other than a covered person-
(i) there are reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has oc-
cuffed; and
(ii) the testimony or document sought is essential to the inves-
tigation, prosecution, or defense; or
(B) in a matter other than a criminal investigation or prosecution,
based on information obtained from a person other than a covered
person, the testimony or document sought is essential to a disposi-
tive issue of substantial importance to that matter; and
(3) in any matter in which the testimony or document sought could re-
veal the identity of a source of information or include any information
that could reasonably be expected to lead to the discovery of the iden-
tity of such a source, that-
(A) disclosure of the identity of such a source is necessary to pre-
vent.98 actual harm to national security;
(B) compelled disclosure of the identity of such a source would pre-
vent such harm; and
(C) the harm sought to be redressed by requiring disclosure clearly
198 The term "imminent" has been removed.
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outweighs the public interest in protecting the free flow of informa-
tion.
(b) Limitations on Content of Information-The content of any testimony or
document that is compelled under subsection (a) shall, to the extent possi-
ble-
(1) be limited to the purpose of verifying information published (or
planned to be published) or describing any surrounding circumstances
relevant to the accuracy of such information published (or planned to
be published); and
(2) be narrowly tailored in subject matter and period of time covered.
SECTION 3. COMPELLED DISCLOSURE PERMITTED.
Notwithstanding any provision of section 2, in any proceeding or in connec-
tion with any issue arising under Federal law, a Federal entity may compel a
covered person to produce any testimony or document that consists only of
commercial or financial information that is not related to news gathering or
the dissemination of news and information by the covered person.
SECTION 4. COMPELLED DISCLOSURE FROM THIRD PARTIES.
(a) Conditions for Compelled Disclosure-Section 2 shall apply to any tes-
timony or document that a third party or a Federal entity seeks from a com-
munications service provider if such testimony or document consists of any
record, information, or other communication that relates to a business trans-
action between a communications service provider and a covered person.
(b) Notice and Opportunity Provided to Covered persons-A court may
compel the testimony or disclosure of a document under this section only af-
ter the party seeking such a document provides the covered person who is a
party to the business transaction described in subsection (a)-
(1) notice of the subpoena or other compulsory request for such testi-
mony or disclosure from the communications service provider not later
than the time at which such subpoena or request is issued to the com-
munications service provider; and
(2) an opportunity to be heard before the court before the time at which
the testimony or disclosure is compelled.
(c) Exception to Notice Requirement-Notice under subsection (b)(1) may
be delayed only if the court determines by clear and convincing evidence






(1) COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROVIDER- The term 'communica-
tions service provider'-
(A) means any person that transmits information of the customer's
choosing by electronic means; and
(B) includes a telecommunications carrier, an information service pro-
vider, an interactive computer service provider, and an information con-
tent provider (as such terms are defined in the §§ 3 and 230 of the
Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. §§ 153, 230)).
(2) COVERED PERSON-The term 'covered person' means-
one who, for gain or livelihood, is engaged in gathering, preparing, collect-
ing, writing, editing, filming, taping or photographing of news intended for a
newspaper, magazine, news agency, press association or wire service or
other professional medium which has as one of its regular functions the
processing and researching of news intended for dissemination to the public;
such person shall be someone performing said function either as a regular
employee or as one otherwise professionally affiliated for gain or livelihood
with such medium of communication. 199
(3) PLANNED TO BE PUBLISHED-The term 'planned to be published'
means a news story in its final, edited form that is scheduled to be published
in the news organization's next publication.
(4) DOCUMENT-The term 'document' means writings, recordings, and
photographs, as those terms are defined by Federal Rule of Evidence 1001
(28 U.S.C. App.).
(5) FEDERAL ENTITY-The term 'Federal entity' means an entity or em-
ployee of the judicial or executive branch or an administrative agency of the
Federal Government with the power to issue a subpoena or provide other
compulsory process.
(6) THIRD PARTY-The term 'third party' means a person other than a
covered person.
V. JUDITH MILLER: APPLYING THE PROPOSED FEDERAL SHIELD
LAW
Judith Miller was a reporter for the New York Times who was held in con-
tempt of court and jailed for refusing to testify about her confidential source
before a grand jury; she has become the central figure in the movement for the
federal shield law. Miller received information from a source within the federal
'99 This text completely replaces the current definition of "covered person."
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government revealing that Valerie Plame, wife of former Ambassador Joseph
Wilson, was an undercover Central Intelligence Agency agent. 200 Apparently,
I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, Vice President Cheney's former Chief of Staff and
assistant for National Security Affairs spread this information around to sev-
eral sources but it was not written about until an article by Robert Novak made
the information about Plame public in a Chicago Sun-Times article."' It is un-
clear how the government knew that Miller had this information, as Miller
never wrote about Plame, but Miller was called to testify before the grand jury.
Miller steadfastly refused to reveal her source and was sent to jail. 202 Because a
federal grand jury indicted Miller, shield law protection was unavailable.
If the author's proposed federal shield law had been in place Miller's situa-
tion would have been drastically different. First, in order to bring Miller before
the grand jury, the government would have had to prove to the court by "clear
and convincing evidence" that: (1) it had exhausted all other avenues for dis-
covering who leaked Plame's identity; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the leak of Plame's identity constituted a crime.
Assuming arguendo that a court could make such a finding, it would then
evaluate the more difficult elements: that finding the leak of the information
was of imminent and actual harm to national security, that her testimony about
her source would prevent such harm, and the public interest in finding this in-
formation outweighs the public interest in protecting the free flow of informa-
tion. It is extremely difficult to classify the leak as causing "imminent and ac-
tual harm to national security." This would, in effect, be stating that if the
source of the leak is not discovered then the safety of the nation is in extreme
peril.
Additionally, it would be a difficult decision for the judge to decide which
public interest prevails now that Congress has determined there is a significant
public interest in the free flow of information. This could be sorted out using
case law, but it is still a difficult decision to render. Furthermore, Section 2(b)
says that the inquiry must be limited to "verifying published information."2 °3
Miller never published a story, so she would be automatically exempt under
this provision. If the federal shield law were in place, Miller could not have
been forced to testify in front of the grand jury, and thus never sent to jail for
contempt.
200 The source was later determined to be I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, the former Chief-of-
Staff for Vice-President Cheney. See, e.g., Greg Pierce, Miller Freed, WASH. TIMES, Sept.
30, 2005, at A 1l.
201 Robert Novak, Even After a Belated Admission of Error Last Week, Finger-Pointing
Continued, CHI. SuN-TIMES, July 14, 2003, at 31.
202 For more about Judith Miller and the Valerie Plame affair, see Van Natta Jr. et al.,
supra note 5.
203 S. 1419, 109th Cong. § 2(b) (2005).
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If the author's proposed changes were implemented, however, there would
be a different result. Instead of having to prove "imminent" danger to national
security and actual harm, the government would only have to prove that there
is danger to national security and actual harm, a much more reasonable stan-
dard. Additionally, the author's proposed change from "published" to "pub-
lished or planned to be published" would give the government more leeway
towards questioning her (though there is, in this case, no evidence that Miller
ever planned to publish on this topic).
If the government can indeed prove to the court that this matter does invoke
our national security by "clear and convincing evidence" after Miller herself
has had the opportunity to testify about why she should not be forced to di-
vulge her source, then Miller would have had procedural due process and must
accept the result. The goal of my proposed shield law is neither to force disclo-
sure of sources nor to keep all sources confidential no matter the circum-
stances, it is a balance of competing public interests, which is what Congress
should achieve with this bill.
VI. CONCLUSION
When the Supreme Court decided Branzburg v. Hayes thirty-three years
ago, a sharply-divided majority decided that journalists had no privilege to re-
sist revealing their confidential sources at common law. Over time, however,
the courts gradually adopted the balancing test from the Powell concurrence
instead of sticking with the hard-line majority decision. When recent decisions
came down that moved back towards showing no consideration for the value of
the press' right to protect their confidential sources, the current rendition of the
federal shield law proposal was born.
The proposed legislation, however, moves too far in the opposite direction
so that no reporter can be compelled to reveal a source except in the most dire
of circumstances. Given the national security concerns that exist in the world
today, there is tremendous value in having whistle-blowers and other sources
confident that they can come forward with their information. This information
is essential to any democracy, but the importance of this element of freedom of
the press cannot quash all efforts involved in protecting our national security.
My proposed changes, which include narrowing the definition of a "covered
person" and removing the "imminence" requirement in order to compel a wit-
ness, would bring a balance to the proposed federal shield law and allow both
contingencies to do their part to keep America safe.
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